Monday, December 31, 2007

Shortest path vs path of least resistance

Forget how the crow flies

By John Kay, FT.com site
Published: Jan 16, 2004

If you want to go in one direction, the best route may involve going in the other. Paradoxical as it sounds, goals are more likely to be achieved when pursued indirectly. So the most profitable companies are not the most profit-oriented, and the happiest people are not those who make happiness their main aim. The name of this idea? Obliquity

The American continent separates the Atlantic Ocean in the east from the Pacific Ocean in the west. But the shortest crossing of America follows the route of the Panama Canal, and you arrive at Balboa Port on the Pacific Coast some 30 miles to the east of the Atlantic entrance at Colon.

A map of the isthmus shows how the best route west follows a south-easterly direction. The builders of the Panama Canal had comprehensive maps, and understood the paradoxical character of the best route. But only rarely in life do we have such detailed knowledge. We are lucky even to have a rough outline of the terrain.

Before the canal, anyone looking for the shortest traverse from the Atlantic to the Pacific would naturally have gazed westward. The south-east route was found by Vasco Nunez de Balboa, a Spanish conquistador who was looking for gold, not oceans.

George W. Bush speaks mangled English rather than mangled French because James Wolfe captured Quebec in 1759 and made the British crown the dominant influence in Northern America. Eschewing obvious lines of attack, Wolfe's men scaled the precipitous Heights of Abraham and took the city from the unprepared defenders. There are many such episodes in military history. The Germans defeated the Maginot Line by going round it, while Japanese invaders bicycled through the Malayan jungle to capture Singapore, whose guns faced out to sea. Oblique approaches are most effective in difficult terrain, or where outcomes depend on interactions with other people. Obliquity is the idea that goals are often best achieved when pursued indirectly.

Obliquity is characteristic of systems that are complex, imperfectly understood, and change their nature as we engage with them. Forests have all these features. Fire is the greatest enemy of the forest. From the late 19th century, the policy of the US National Parks Service was of zero tolerance towards fire. Every outbreak, however small, would be extinguished. But the incidence of fire did not fall: it increased.

Computer simulation of fire control policies suggests the explanation. Most forest fires are small, and burn themselves out. In doing so, they remove combustible undergrowth, and create firebreaks that limit the spread of future fires. In 1972, the National Park Service determined a new policy: it would put out man-made fires, but allow natural ones to burn.

Sixteen years later, the largest fire known swept through Yellowstone National Park. In extremely dry conditions, several fires - some sparked by lightning, some by arsonists - joined together. The blaze was fought by 25,000 firefighters at a cost of $120m; more than a third of the park's vegetation was destroyed.

Today's guidelines allow forest rangers to use their judgment in deciding which fires should be tackled and which left to burn. Experience has shown that too much effort devoted to fire extinction is counterproductive. Time demonstrates, but only slowly, whether policy has gone too far in one direction, or the other. Forest management illustrates obliquity: the preservation of the forest is not best pursued directly, but managed through a holistic approach that considers and balances multiple objectives.

Forests are not the only systems structured in this way. Obliquity is equally relevant to our businesses and our bodies, to the management of our lives and our national economies. We do not maximise shareholder value or the length of our lives, our happiness or the gross national product, for the simple but fundamental reason that we do not know how to and never will. No one will ever be buried with the epitaph "He maximised shareholder value". Not just because it is a less than inspiring objective, but because even with hindsight there is no way of recognising whether the objective has been achieved.

For most of the 20th century, ICI was Britain's largest and most successful manufacturing company. In 1987, ICI described its business purpose thus: "ICI aims to be the world's leading chemical company, serving customers internationally through the innovative and responsible application of chemistry and related science.

"Through achievement of our aim, we will enhance the wealth and well-being of our shareholders, our employees, our customers and the communities which we serve and in which we operate."

ICI's corporate portfolio had evolved over the decades - the company's traditional strengths had been dyes and explosives, but its chemical expertise had taken it into other industrial feedstocks and agricultural fertilisers. After the second world war, the management of ICI concluded that in future "the responsible application of chemistry" was most likely to be found in pharmaceuticals. ICI recruited a team of able, young, academic scientists but the team was slow to bring returns.

The pharmaceutical division was a drain of ICI resources until, in the 1960s, the discovery of beta-blockers gave the company the first effective drug for controlling hypertension. More discoveries followed and, by the 1980s, pharmaceuticals had become the growth engine of the company.

In 1991, Hanson, the predatory UK conglomerate that had successfully acquired and reorganised sluggish British manufacturing businesses such as Ever Ready and Imperial Tobacco, bought a modest stake in ICI. While the threat to the company's independence did not last long, the effects were galvanising. ICI restructured its operations and floated the pharmaceutical division as a separate business, Zeneca. The rump business of ICI declared a new mission statement: "Our objective is to maximise value for our shareholders by focusing on businesses where we have market leadership, a technological edge and a world competitive cost base."

While the National Parks Service had moved from a narrow, focused objective to a broader holistic view of forest management. ICI made the opposite shift - from a grand vision of the responsible application of chemistry to a narrow concentration on established, successful activities. The aim of bringing benefit to a wide range of stakeholders was replaced by the specific objective of creating shareholder value from narrowly focused operations. The company translated this into an operational strategy by disposing of the company's interests in bulk chemicals to acquire a niche group of speciality businesses: ICI, once the main supplier of chemical products to one third of the world, was reinvented as a smells company.

The outcome was not successful in any terms, including those of creating shareholder value. The share price peaked in 1998, soon after the new strategy was announced. The decline since then has been relentless. After two successive dividend cuts the company was ejected in early 2003 from the FTSE 100 index, the transition from industrial giant to mid-cap corporation had taken only 12 years.

ICI is not the only company for whom greater emphasis on corporate financial goals led to less success in achieving them. I once said that Boeing's grip on the world civil aviation market made it the most powerful market leader in world business. Bill Allen was chief executive from 1945 to 1968, as the company created its dominant position. He said that his spirit and that of his colleagues was to eat, breathe, and sleep the world of aeronautics. "The greatest pleasure life has to offer is the satisfaction that flows from participating in a difficult and constructive undertaking," he explained.

Boeing's 737, with almost 4,000 aircraft in the air, is the most successful commercial airliner in history. But the company's largest and riskiest project was the development of the 747 jumbo jet. When a non-executive director asked about the expected return on investment, he was brushed off: there had been some studies, he was told, but the manager concerned couldn't remember the results.

It took only 10 years for Boeing to prove me wrong in asserting that its market position in civil aviation was impregnable. The decisive shift in corporate culture followed the acquisition of its principal US rival, McDonnell Douglas, in 1997. The transformation was exemplified by the CEO, Phil Condit. The company's previous preoccupation with meeting "technological challenges of supreme magnitude" would, he told Business Week, now have to change. "We are going into a value-based environment where unit cost, return on investment and shareholder return are the measures by which you'll be judged. That's a big shift."

The company's senior executives agreed to move from Seattle, where the main production facilities were located, to Chicago. More importantly, the more focused business reviewed risky investments in new civil projects with much greater scepticism. The strategic decision was to redirect resources towards projects for the US military that involved low financial risk. Chicago had the advantage of being nearer to Washington, where government funds were dispensed.

So Boeing's civil orderbook today lags that of Airbus, the European consortium whose aims were not initially commercial but which has, almost by chance, become a profitable business. And the strategy of getting close to the Pentagon proved counter- productive: the company got too close to the Pentagon, and faced allegations of corruption. And what was the market's verdict on the company's performance in terms of unit cost, return on investment and shareholder return? Boeing stock, $48 when Condit took over, rose to $70 as he affirmed the commitment to shareholder value; by the time of his enforced resignation in December 2003 it had fallen to $38.

In Yellowstone National Park, at ICI and at Boeing, the attempt to focus on simple, well defined objectives proved less successful than management with a broader, more comprehensive conception of objectives.

The 20th century saw the rise and fall of modernist rationalism in many activities. Nowhere was the change more visible, or the results more disastrous, than in architecture and town planning. In the modernist vision, technology emancipated builders from tradition and accumulated knowledge. Twentieth- century planners could redesign our environment from first principles.

Charles Jencks, the architectural commentator, announced that modernism ended at 3.32pm on July 15 1972, when demolition contractors detonated the fuses to blow up the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St Louis, Missouri. Less than two decades earlier, the scheme had won awards for its pioneering, visionary architecture. Tower blocks were the supreme expression of Le Corbusier's view that "a house is a machine for living in". Corbusier himself designed the first such buildings, the Unite d'Habitation on the edge of Marseilles.

But a house is not simply a machine for living in. There is a difference between a house and a home. The functions of a home are complex and the utility of a building depends not only on its design but on the reactions of those who live in it. The occupants of the Pruitt-Igoe scheme, like those of similar buildings, were alienated by the isolation of a living environment that saw no need for accidental, unplanned social interactions. They showed no respect for its public spaces. The functionality of the blocks proved, in the end, not to be functional.

Communities are complex organisms, imperfectly understood, and their functioning depends on their social relations. Great architects implicitly understand obliquity, but obliquity is so important to the design of towns that the most successful towns have no designer at all. The planned city was conceived in the late 19th century. Baron Hausmann swept away the jumble of Paris streets that had developed over the centuries to create grand boulevards. From the 1920s to 1968, the powerful, autocratic Robert Moses controlled the physical environment of New York, driving expressways through apartments, offices and factories.

The zenith of these ideas was reached in planned cities such as the designed capitals of Brasilia, Canberra and Chandigarh. But all these cities are dull. They lack the vitality of real communities. As with tower blocks, their very functionality is dysfunctional.

The National Park officials who thought they could eliminate fire; the managers who thought they could reinvent ICI and Boeing; the architects who believed they could discard thousands of years of experience and redesign buildings on purely functional lines; the planners who attempted to rationalise the patchwork evolution of historic cities: all made the same mistake of underestimating the complexity of the system with which they dealt and the value of the traditional knowledge they inherited. And the answer to their problem is not better analysis and more sophisticated modelling, but more humility.

Such humility is not commonly found in the business world. Re-engineering the Corporation by Michael Hammer and James Champy became a New York Times bestseller in 1993. Hammer and Champy are as radical in aspiration as Le Corbusier: "Re-engineering means asking the question `If I were re-creating this company today, given what I know and given current technology, what would it look like?' Re-engineering a company means tossing aside old systems and starting over. It involves going back to the beginning and inventing a better way of doing work."

Obliquity gives rise to the profit-seeking paradox: the most profitable companies are not the most profit-oriented. ICI and Boeing illustrate how a greater focus on shareholder returns was self-defeating in its own narrow terms. Comparisons of the same companies over time are mirrored in contrasts between different companies in the same industries. In their 2002 book, Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, Jim Collins and Jerry Porras compared outstanding companies with adequate but less remarkable companies with similar operations.

Merck and Pfizer was one such comparison. Collins and Porras compared the philosophy of George Merck ("We try never to forget that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear. The better we have remembered it, the larger they have been") with that of John McKeen of Pfizer ("So far as humanly possible, we aim to get profit out of everything we do").

Collins and Porras also paired Hewlett Packard with Texas Instruments, Procter & Gamble with Colgate, Marriott with Howard Johnson, and found the same result in each case: the company that put more emphasis on profit in its declaration of objectives was the less profitable in its financial statements.

Similarly the richest men are not the most materialistic. Sam Walton, founder and principal shareholder of Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer, drove himself around in a pick-up truck. "I have concentrated all along on building the finest retailing company that we possibly could. Period. Creating a huge personal fortune was never particularly a goal of mine," Walton said. Still, five of the top 10 places in the Forbes rich list are occupied by members of the Walton family.

Henry Ford was sued by stockholders who resented his determination to expand his automotive business rather than distribute the profits. When they won their case, most of the dividend that the court required the Ford Motor Company to pay went to Henry himself. He used the money to buy back stock and regain freedom of operations. The dissatisfied stockholders would have done better to keep quiet.

Warren Buffett, the most successful investor in history, still lives in the Omaha bungalow he bought almost 50 years ago and continues to take pleasure in a Nebraskan steak washed down with cherry Coke. For Buffett: "It's not that I want money. It's the fun of making money and watching it grow."

The individuals who are most successful at making money are not those who are most interested in making money. This is not surprising. The principal route to great wealth is the creation of a successful business, and building a successful business demands exceptional talents and hard work. There is no reason to think these characteristics are associated with greed and materialism: rather the opposite. People who are obsessively interested in money are drawn to get-rich-quick schemes rather than to business opportunities, and when these schemes come off, as occasionally they do, they retire to their villas in the sun.

And so, the greatest happiness is rarely achieved by those who set out to be happy. The development of psychology and neurophysiology gives us more insight into the real determinants of happiness. Author and psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi explores the nature of happiness by listening to what people say about their activities through what he calls experience sampling. He pages people frequently to write down structured reports of exactly how they feel about what they are doing at that moment.

Although we crave time for passive leisure, people engaged in watching television reported low levels of contentment. Csikszentmihalyi's systematic finding is that the activities that yield the highest for satisfaction with life require the successful performance of challenging tasks. These moments are encountered as frequently in work as outside it, and they constitute the state of mind which Csikszentmihalyi describes as flow. "Flow tends to occur when a person's skills are fully involved in overcoming a challenge that is just about manageable."

Csikszentmihalyi's formulation exactly parallels that of Boeing's Bill Allen - "the greatest pleasure that life has to offer is the satisfaction that flows from participating in a difficult and challenging undertaking." Flow is as characteristic of the successful business as of the contented individual.

Yet there are fundamental differences. While the quest for happiness is complementary - by achieving it we make it easier, not harder, for others to achieve the same goal - the development of business is competitive. Tolstoy claimed in Anna Karenina that "All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."

However, the opposite is true in commercial life. Unhappy businesses resemble one another: each successful company is successful in its own way. Business achievement depends on doing things that others cannot do - and still find difficult to do even after others have seen the benefits they bring to the imitators. So the most profitable companies are those that are successful with major challenges - like Boeing's creation of the jumbo jet or ICI's development of a pharmaceutical division. For Csikszentmihalyi, flow is the accomplishment of a difficult task, involving the successful match of capabilities to environment. In the less elegant language of business gurus, Collins and Porras describe the same phenomenon in business as the achievement of "big hairy audacious goals".

Companies that succeed in such challenges are disproportionately represented in the case studies of business schools. We don't hear much about business innovators who adopted big hairy audacious goals and failed, although failure, not success is the norm. For every Bill Gates, Sam Walton and Warren Buffett, there are a hundred people with similar ambitions, and not necessarily much less talent, whose pictures will never be seen on the front cover of Fortune magazine.

Success through obliquity is a product of natural selection in an uncertain, but competitive, environment. It is almost certainly true that, on average, profit-oriented companies are more profitable than less profit-oriented companies. It is very likely that on average people who are interested in money are richer than people who are not. But at the same time that the most profitable companies are not the most profit-oriented, the richest people are not those most interested in money. Outstanding success is the product of obliquity.

This oblique relationship between intention and outcome is the subtle, but frequently misunderstood, message contained in Richard Dawkins' metaphor of the selfish gene. The gene is not actually selfish: the gene has no motive at all, in the sense in which we normally talk about motive. Genes that survive the processes of selection are those well adapted to their environment, and such adaptation was not the product of any conscious design. And this is also true of the forests we travel thousands of miles to see, the great capital cities of history, the traditions of classical architecture, and the development of great businesses. All of them are the product of evolution in a universe too complex and unpredictable for any of us fully to understand. All of them survive and prosper because they are well adapted to their environment.

The University of Sheffield Sports Engineering Research Group, after analysing David Beckham's performance on the football field, announced in 2002 that they had discovered a physics genius. The scientists had identified the complex differential equations that need to be solved to bend it like Beckham. No doubt their computers are already crunching numbers to tell Jonny Wilkinson how to drop a goal.

But little research is needed to confirm that Beckham is not a physics genius. Solving equations of motion is a means of understanding what happens, but is not a means of making it happen. Similarly, the financial returns of a business record what it achieves but are not the means by which it is achieved. Successful companies do maximise long-term shareholder value, or at least create large quantities of it. But that does not imply they were any more capable of formally calculating the results of their activities than Beckham can. Still less can we infer that such calculations were the basis of their achievement.

Would Boeing really have benefited from careful analyses in the mid-1960s of the prospective return on investment from development of the 747? An analyst would have had to anticipate the oil shock, the globalisation of world markets and the development of the aviation industry through to the end of the century. Anyone who has built models of these kinds, or scrutinised them carefully, knows that the range of possible assumptions is always wide enough to allow the analyst to come up with whatever answer the person commissioning the assessment wants to hear.

ICI might have made calculations in the 1950s that estimated the market capitalisation Zeneca would have achieved in the year 2000. Their strategists could then have put that number into a discounted cash flow calculation to estimate a return on the company's early investment in its pharmaceutical business. But no one would or should have taken such a calculation seriously.

The distinction between intent and outcome is central to obliquity. Wealth, family relationships, employment all contribute to happiness but these activities are not best conducted with happiness as their goal. The pursuit of happiness is a strange phrase in the US constitution because happiness is not best achieved when pursued. A satisfying life depends above all on building good personal relationships with other people - but we entirely miss the point if we seek to develop these relationships with our personal happiness as a primary goal.

Humans have well developed capacities to detect purely instrumental behaviour. The actions of the man who buys us a drink in the hope that we will buy his mutual funds are formally the same as those of the friend who buys us a drink because he likes our company, but it is usually not too difficult to spot the difference. And the difference matters to us. "Honesty is the best policy, but he who is governed by that maxim is not an honest man," wrote Archbishop Whately three centuries ago. If we deal with someone for whom honesty is the best policy, we can never be sure that this is not the occasion on which he will conclude that honesty is no longer the best policy. Such experiences have been frequent in financial markets in the last decade. We do better to rely on people who are honest by character rather than honest by choice.

In a similar way, the statement "we look after employees because we care" is not the same as the statement "we have introduced new compensation arrangements because, having calculated the relative costs of benefits enhancements and staff turnover, and commissioned a consultant's report on the policies of competitors, we believe it will produce a net enhancement of earnings per share". Even if the pensions and healthcare benefits are the same, the response from those affected is different. That is why companies that put the second statement in their board papers and investor presentations typically put the first statement in their press releases and communications to employees. But people who work in a business generally know its nature well enough to see the instrumentality at work.

Marks and Spencer was famous for decades for the breadth of its staff welfare programme. In particular, the company pioneered the provision of high-quality meals at nominal prices. The policy did not originate in any nice calculation of costs and benefits. It was adopted when a shop assistant fainted as Simon Marks was making one of his legendary store visits. Marks discovered that her husband was unemployed and the family did not have enough to eat. Marks was not engaged in philanthropy - he did not offer to feed his employee's family. Nor was his purpose the creation of shareholder value. Marks was making a sincerely felt statement about the kind of business he wanted his company to be. Such statements about the nature of the business defined the iconic company Marks and Spencer became. As at ICI and Boeing, Marks and Spencer was to sacrifice that status in the rationalist 1990s in the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of growth in earnings per share.

You don't prolong life much by adopting long life as your goal. Nor do you learn much about the sources of longevity by asking very old people how they did it. Medical interventions don't have a large overall impact on life expectancy - medicine is to health what fire control is to forest management. The most important influences on life expectancy are environment and general health. We extend our lives most effectively, not through hypochondria, but by caring for our bodies and ourselves in a comprehensive, holistic manner.

Happiness is achieved in the same way. As John Stuart Mill said: "Those only are happy who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness... aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way."

The great cities of the world lift our spirits, not because some great designer set out to achieve that effect, but because of their lack of planning, their diversity and vitality, their unexpected encounters and conjunctions. And they evolve, not through conservative preservation or planned change, but by a process in which undistinguished buildings are torn down and only the best examples of each era are preserved.

Forest management is unexpectedly complex. The regimented plantation proved as unsuccessful as the planned city, and ecologists today are tearing such plantations down. Monocultural forests are not only dull to look at, but vulnerable to disease and fire. Managed woodlands are economically and environmentally superior. But no one knows the best way to manage a forest, or even what "best" means in this context. Our objective in a complex system is not to find the optimum, because no one can know before or after whether such an optimum has been achieved. We can and should be satisfied with an outcome that is good enough.

What is true of forests is equally true of businesses. The great corporations of the modern world were not built by people whose overriding interest was wealth, profit, or shareholder value. To paraphrase Mill: their focus was on business followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they found profit by the way.

This is how Hewlett Packard described it: "Profit is a cornerstone of what we do... but it has never been the point in and of itself. The point, in fact, is to win, and winning is judged in the eyes of the customer and by doing something you can be proud of."

Obliquity is relevant whenever complex systems evolve in an uncertain environment, and whenever the effect of our actions depends on the ways in which others respond to them. There is a role for carrots and sticks, but to rely on carrots and sticks alone is effective only when we employ donkeys and when goals are simple. Directness is appropriate. When the environment is stable, objectives are one dimensional and transparent, and it is possible to determine when and whether goals have been achieved. Obliquity is inevitable when the environment is complex and changing, purposes are multiple and conflicting, and when we cannot tell, even with hindsight, whether they have been fulfilled.

Balboa made the first transit of the American continent. The last great crossing was the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, which runs almost 3,000 miles from Toronto to Vancouver. The most impenetrable stretch of the Rockies was the Selkirk Mountains. The builders of the railroad, faced with a costly detour, offered $5,000 and naming rights to anyone who discovered a pass. These incentives worked. On the Trans-Canada Highway today you cross the Selkirks through the pass named for the ambitious and intrepid Major A.B. Rogers. But even here, obliquity kicks in. The Rogers Pass is more or less parallel to the Panama Canal, and your westward journey across Canada is best accomplished by veering south-east to traverse it. But sometimes directness is the best solution. In the 1910s, after struggling to keep the Rogers Pass open in an area that often gets 100 metres of snow per year, Canadian Pacific bored a tunnel that runs straight as an arrow through Mount Macdonald.

John Kay is an FT columnist and the author of `The Truth About Markets' (Allen Lane)

Friday, December 14, 2007

Mezzanine funds gain an edge in credit market turmoils

LBOs Find Cash as Goldman, TCW Raise Mezzanine Funds (Update1)

By Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam and Jason Kelly

Dec. 13 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc., TCW Group Inc. and New York Life Capital Partners are raising more than $30 billion to increase their investments in leveraged buyouts.

At least 32 firms are starting mezzanine debt funds as investors shun bonds and loans used to finance LBOs out of concern that the collapse of prices for subprime-mortgage securities will spread. Mezzanine funds make loans to companies at higher rates than banks and buy their preferred stock. They earn returns from interest payments and the eventual sale of the equity interest.

``Today, virtually no one is willing to finance LBOs and it's created an opportunity for mezzanine providers,'' said John Morris, managing director at Boston-based HarbourVest Partners LLC, which oversees $24 billion of private-equity investments for institutions.

Goldman, the world's most profitable securities firm, is gathering $20 billion for the biggest mezzanine fund, said two people with knowledge of the matter. TCW, which manages more than $150 billion, is raising $4.5 billion to split between two funds, said the people, who declined to be identified because the companies haven't disclosed their plans.

Officials at New York-based Goldman and TCW in Los Angeles declined to comment.

New York Life Capital, the investment unit of New York Life Insurance Co., raised $800 million last month for its second mezzanine fund, $200 million more than originally sought. The fund will provide financing for acquisitions as large as $4 billion, said Thomas Haubenstricker, a senior managing principal at the firm.

Funding Backlog

``We have the opportunity in this market to work on deals that are larger than what would typically come to our market,'' Haubenstricker said.

With financing readily available, LBO firms announced a record $582.6 billion of deals in the first half of 2007, data compiled by Bloomberg show. That fell to $171 billion in the past five months as lenders were left with $370 billion of debt that they couldn't sell to investors, according to a Sept. 24 note by analysts at Bank of America Corp. in New York.

``When the big commercial banks move, they go far in both directions,'' said Rick Rickertsen, managing partner of Washington-based private-equity firm Pine Creek Partners.

While the banks have reduced some of the backlog, they are still sitting on $230 billion of debt, according to a Dec. 4 report by JPMorgan Chase & Co. analysts in New York.

Taking More Risk

Private-equity firms use funds raised from investors to finance as much as 30 percent of their acquisitions. They borrow the rest against the assets of the companies they buy, using the business's cash flow to pay down the debt.

As much as 50 percent of the funding comes from senior debt, which banks package and sell to investors. The remainder is financed using high-yield loans and mezzanine debt, which is unsecured, high-yield borrowing that ranks last for repayment in the event of default.

``The ability to access the high-yield markets, which is a very important component of all buyouts, has if not disappeared, become very tough,'' said Scott Sperling, co-president of buyout firm Thomas H. Lee Partners LP in Boston, said today in a Bloomberg TV interview. ``That makes mezzanine financing a more attractive alternative and sometimes the only alternative to help finance buyouts.''

Mezzanine funds also acquire equity in some buyouts to generate higher returns for investors. They take the added risk to earn annual returns of as much as 20 percent before fees, said Patrick Campbell, a principal at New York-based Benedetto Gartland & Co., which raises money for mezzanine-fund managers.

By contrast, junk bonds, often sold as part of LBOs, returned an average 6.97 percent from 1997 to 2006, according to indexes compiled by Merrill Lynch & Co.

``Investors have a much greater appetite for mezzanine funds because the risk-return rewards are so much better,'' Campbell said.


The following is a list of the 10 largest mezzanine funds being
raised:

Fund Target Manager
GS Mezzanine Partners V $20B Goldman Sachs
TCW/Crescent Mezzanine Fund V $2.5B Trust Co. of the
West
TCW Energy Fund XIV $2B Trust Co. of the
West
N.Y. Life Mezz. Partners II $800M* N.Y. Life Capital
Capzanine II $368M** Capzanine
CapitalSouth Partners Fund II $300M CapitalSouth
Partners
Darby Asia Mezzanine Fund II $300M Darby Overseas Ltd.
Darby Latin Am. Mezz. Fund II $300M Darby Overseas Ltd.
MidWest Mezzanine Fund IV $200M Midwest Mezzanine
BNY Mezzanine Partners $200M Bank of N.Y./Mellon

*Closed

**250 million euros

Thursday, December 6, 2007

Some asset backed loans are better than others

Despite Credit Woes, Asset-backed Loan Funds Enjoy Steady Returns

By David Price

With Wall Street’s giants taking billion-dollar write-downs from subprime-linked losses following this summer’s spate of hedge fund closures, mortgage lending has become the black sheep of the investment family. But a small number of hedge funds have carved out a niche for themselves in this market, and the results are eye-opening.

Even at the height of the credit meltdown this summer, the Ambit Bridge Loan Fund was clicking along, turning out roughly the same 1% return it has produced each month since its March 2005 launch. Contrast that with the shellacking many other funds took at the same time and Ambit's strategy of asset-backed lending looks positively stellar.

Ambit originates and services short-term real-estate loans, writing checks for up to $25 million to developers seeking to get commercial projects off the ground. The loans are secured at a maximum of 70% of the property's value. Interest, which is typically 12% to 15% per year, is pre-paid and held in escrow, creating a sure-fire revenue stream to support fund returns. Through the end of October, the domestic Ambit fund and an affiliated offshore fund, Ambit Bridge Loan International, are up 9.84% net this year. Over the past 12 months, both funds were ahead 12.72%.

"During the past few months, our strategies have held up very well," Ambit Managing Director Ben Shoval says, adding that the recent upheaval in the credit markets may actually be working to Ambit's advantage by expanding the pool of potential borrowers.

Meanwhile, Jonathan Kanterman, managing director at hedge fund firm Stillwater Capital Partners, estimates that dealflow for his New York-based firm has tripled in recent months, with traditional bank lenders pulling back as the sub-prime credit crisis spreads. Like Ambit, Stillwater is enjoying significant improvement in the collateral offered by would-be borrowers as well as a favorable swing in the loan terms it can command.

But perhaps most noticeably, Kanterman says, there has been a big jump in investor interest. He explains that in the past, the lack of volatility in ABL fund returns was often a fund’s own worst enemy, because many institutional investors were willing to take on more risk in return for the potential for much bigger returns. Then, the credit and equity markets began to sink, "and all of a sudden, the steady-eddy hedges like us were getting a lot more attention," he says.

Both Ambit and Stillwater are currently open to new investors, and Stillwater also recently partnered with U.K.-based Matrix Group to market a new fund of ABL funds. The firms have weathered the recent financial turmoil relatively unscathed, although Ambit did have a $5 million redemption earlier this year when a pair of limited partners with their own cash needs¬ pulled out of its fund.

Shoval, who managed three funds of hedge funds for several years before locking in on an ABL strategy in 2005, says his investors now include at least one "major" investment bank, a few insurance companies and a family office. Assets under management across both the domestic and offshore funds by the Wilkes-Barre, Pa.-based firm total about $210 million.

According to Gregg Winter, president and founder of Winter & Co. Commercial Real Estate Finance, a commercial mortgage brokerage and advisory firm in New York, hedge funds are a more efficient vehicle to source, originate and service short-term loans, compared with pulling together investors for each deal. He launched the W Financial Mortgage Fund in June 2003 and now manages nearly $30 million, all from accredited individuals. The fund makes close to $80 million in loans, and net returns for investors have been just under 11% per year since inception.

"This is a progression of hard-money lending," Winter says, adding that investors benefit by gaining greater diversification and a more reliable income stream under the hedge fund model. "It's the same philosophy behind investing in a mutual fund—there's a lot less risk in spreading out investments across a portfolio of stocks rather in than a single company." Looking to capitalize on the booming interest in asset-based lending, Winter plans to open up the fund to institutional investors in early 2008.

As with any asset-backed vehicle, the biggest downside risk for ABL funds would be a precipitous decline in the value of the underlying asset. But while residential property values have fallen in many parts of the country, commercial real estate prices have so far held strong. The short time frame, along with the low loan-to-value ratio typical for bridge loans, also provides a substantial financial cushion for fund managers if a borrower falls behind or defaults on a loan. A sudden glut of similar properties on the market could whittle away some of those gains, Kanterman says, although "it's pretty unlikely that the commercial real estate market is going to drop 25% or 30% in only a year or two.”

Because of their stringent due diligence, however, most ABL fund managers say that foreclosures are extremely rare in their business. At Ambit, Shoval said he has only had one loan get into trouble, while Winter says W Financial has yet to experience a single default or foreclosure.

As a rule, ABL funds are also relatively conservative in their own use of leverage. Many, like Ambit, don't borrow at all, although some of its limited partners have levered positions to boost their earnings potential. Winter, on the other hand, said he occasionally will take on debt—either to keep the fund fully deployed or to swing slightly larger deals.

And despite the growing interest by institutions and the resulting tide of new money, Winter said he doesn't anticipate the eventual rise of huge ABL mega-funds. Real estate is a very local business, he explains, making it tough for a firm to expand much beyond the markets it already knows intimately.

"This is a niche strategy, and to do it well, you really have to understand the territory. That's probably going to keep most firms from getting too big or going national," he says. "I'd think it would be difficult to ramp up to $1 billion or more in size.

Old feature article on CDO recovery rates

May 2004 | Feature

CDO guide: recovery rates

Severity of default is key

(Credit Magazine) For investors to feel comfortable with investing in CDOs they must feel confident about the circumstances under which they will win and lose. Here the recovery rate of the underlying assets is the key to performance

For investors in the CDO market, it is important to distinguish between default and recovery rates. A default is defined as occurring at the moment that a promised payment on a bond is missed by the issuer, or the time at which an announcement of a missed payment is made regardless of the allowable grace period. For example, the way that Moody’s rates bonds means: “If issuer ABC misses an interest payment on the due date but makes the payment during the grace period, Moody’s treats ABC as a defaulted issuer at the time of the missed payment.”

For CDO investors, therefore, the severity of loss rather than the severity of default is the key. Clearly, recovery rates in the event of liquidation of assets will vary widely across various claims in the capital structure. S&P’s recovery assumptions, for example, range from highs of 50% to 60% in the case of senior secured bank loans through to lows of 15% to 28% for subordinated debt and just 15% for emerging market corporates. For individual distressed credits, therefore, recovery rates can also vary dramatically. For example, according to figures published by S&P, recovery rates have varied from as low as 9–12% for WorldCom and 11–24% for Enron through to as high as 78–90% in the case of Railtrack in the UK.

Aside from the specific circumstances of default, a number of other factors can and do influence recovery rates. For example, on average, the longer collateral managers hold on to defaulted securities, the greater their recovery values become. That does not necessarily mean that collateral managers will usually aim to retain ownership of defaulted securities, because in most cases the terms of their contracts will make them forced sellers in a default scenario.

The important differences between default and recovery rates mean that calculating historical recovery levels and therefore extrapolating likely future trends is far from straightforward. A complication in the European market is that information on recovery rates has historically been kept private by banks in the loan market, forcing rating agencies and other analysts to apply a so-called ‘haircut’ to recovery rate data from the US, where much broader information on recovery rates for bonds and loans is available.

An added complication, especially for CDO investors tutored in the bankruptcy laws that apply in the US, is that insolvency regimes continue to differ throughout Europe. France, for example, is notorious for being highly protective of borrowers while Germany is regarded as being much more pro-secured creditors. Furthermore, as the Credit Guide to CDOs published in 2002 observed: “In many European jurisdictions, bond investors have no control over any work-out process: this is in stark contrast to the situation in the US, where both loan and bond investors get a seat at the table. As a result of these structural features, European high-yield bonds are proving to have abysmal recovery rates.”

Those poor European recovery rates, however, are not confined to the high-yield market. According to Moody’s, while the default rate in the European corporate bond market plunged from 20.1% in 2002 to 6.9% in 2003, the average recovery rate was almost unchanged at 19.9% in 2003 compared with 20% the previous year. Recovery rates in Europe, Moody’s advises, continue to be roughly half the North American average.

Structuring and constructing a CDO

The financial press will often make its first mention of a ‘new’ CDO on or around the time of its closing – with the closing date generally the day on which the CDO issues tranches of debt and equity to investors. Prior to that day, however, there will have been a so-called pre-closing or ‘warehousing’ period, typically lasting between three and six months. During that period the asset manager will have acquired (or ‘warehoused’) assets to act as collateral for the securities to be issued by the CDO via a special-purpose vehicle (SPV – see box) on the closing day. Closing of a fund usually occurs when a CDO has acquired between 40% and 60% of its targeted assets.

Clearly, however, given that the proceeds of the CDO notes will only become available following their sale on closing day, CDO managers will often need a bridging loan facility (or ‘warehouse facility’) during the warehousing period.

Following the issuance of notes on closing day, the CDO will have a period usually lasting between 60 and 360 days – although the period can also be much longer – in which to complete the process of buying the assets backing the CDO. This important phase is commonly known as the ramp-up period, and the year in which the ramping-up takes place is referred to as the CDO’s vintage. The final investment amount amassed following the ramp-up is sometimes known as the target par amount, which is the total size of the fund less its start-up costs. A portfolio that has been ramped-up with a relatively large number of small exposures is described as being granular, whereas a more concentrated portfolio with a small number of exposures is known as a lumpy fund.

After completion of the ramp-up, there is usually a reinvestment (or revolving) phase lasting up to five years, during which any cashflows arising from amortisation, maturity, prepayment or the sale of assets can be reinvested, as long as a number of basic performance objectives have been maintained.

Finally, during the amortisation phase, which can last for between five and 30 years depending on the underlying assets of the CDO, cashflows earned by the fund are used to pay down its liabilities.

CDO repackaging (repacks)

The repackaging of CDOs (known as CDO repacks) is a relatively recent phenomenon arising from the poor performance of a number of CDOs in 2002 and 2003, and another good example of the flexibility and adaptability of the market to respond to fluctuations in credit quality and economic volatility. Repacks are considered to be ‘first derivatives’ of CDOs and, as Moody’s explains: “In a typical repack, the terms of the existing CDO are restructured, with changes in seniority, notional amount, coupon, maturity and waterfall priority. The cashflows of the existing debt are used to support restructured debt securities to achieve the desired ratings.”

Moody’s adds that repackaged structures, 45 of which were rated by the agency in 2003 compared with just 11 in 2002, will be able to achieve a higher rating due to an increased subordination and the support of extra interest. “After the restructuring of the existing CDO structure, the new bond will be more appealing to the investors who are seeking higher credit quality,” Moody’s notes.

The role of the SPV

ABS (including CDOs) are generally issued by SPVs or special-purpose entities set up to allow for the transfer of risk from the originator to an entity that is generally thinly capitalised, bankruptcy-remote and isolated from any credit risk associated with the originator.

According to a JP Morgan handbook: “To limit the universe of an SPV’s potential creditors, it is usually a newly established entity, with no operating history that could give rise to prior liabilities. The SPV’s business purpose and activities are limited to only those necessary to effect the particular transaction for which the SPV has been established (for example, issuing its securities and purchasing and holding its assets), thereby reducing the likelihood of the SPV incurring post-closing liabilities that are in addition or unrelated to those anticipated by rating agencies and investors.”

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Securitization as an option for Project Financing depends on timing

PPP/PFI
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Project finance securitisation
03 October 2007

Banks which arrange and participate in project finance debt are building significant risk concentrations around this asset class. As margins fall and maturities extend, it is expected that there will be fewer participant banks active in the syndicated loan market. Mark Gordon, Head of Securitisation, Structuring and Placement at SMBC Europe, examines how project finance debt arrangers have turned to the securitisation market to manage their loan portfolios more efficiently

Global demand for infrastructure and the project financing that supports it is at an all time high, with investors financing US$129bn worth of infrastructure projects in H1 2007, US$114bn in H2 2006, US$111bn in H1 2006 and US$104bn and US$66bn in the second and first halves of 2005 (these figures do not include so-called 'Alternative Investments')1.

However the knock-on effects of the US sub-prime crisis have adversely impacted the wider securitisation market. Issuers, arrangers and rating agencies continue to structure project finance securitisations in anticipation of the market returning gradually over the next few months.

Issuer Motivations

For the banks that have issued synthetic securitisations of portfolios of project finance loans and bonds, the prime motivation to date has been regulatory capital release. Under Basle I, drawn project finance loans are risk weighted at 100%. Under Basel II, these loans (which are a category of Specialised Lending) are risk weighted at 70% at best under Foundation IRB. Under Advanced IRB, this risk weighting may be reduced to a much lower level. Most of the structures we have seen are Basel I compliant and incorporate call features on the super senior swap, reflecting the low risk weighting for retained super senior under the new capital accord. The release of regulatory and economic capital around a specific portfolio improves both return on equity and return on risk asset.

These deals are generally replenishable and as such are used as ongoing portfolio management tools. During the pre-agreed replenishment period, as loans amortize, prepay or cancel, the originating bank may replenish with new loans. These new loans must meet the replenishment criteria set out in the offering circular. The replenishment criteria are set to protect the interests of the note investors.

A secondary motivation for issuing banks is the arbitrage between the margin income on the loan portfolio and the cost of buying protection via the securitisation. Despite falling margins in the loan market, the arbitrage case is quite compelling given the alternatives i.e asset sales or monoline wraps, both of which can have a negative impact on a lending bank's relationship with project borrowers/sponsors. The arbitrage is improved by the expected maturity mismatch between the underlying assets and the credit-linked notes.

For an originator to achieve full regulatory capital release from the securitisation, the legal maturity of the hedge must equal or exceed the legal maturity of the underlying assets. The final legal maturity of SMBCE's SMART PFI 2007 transaction is March 2044. This reflects the maturity of the longest dated asset in the reference portfolio. As you can imagine, ABS investors have little interest in 37 year PFI risk.

Therefore synthetic securitisations are normally structured to incorporate a call feature at the originator's option. In the case of SMART PFI 2007 the call is at year 7. The note investors are comfortable that the originator will call the deal at this time, as the securitisation starts to become less efficient once the replenishment period has ended. This is due to the effect of scheduled amortisation and prepayments on the reference portfolio when set against certain fixed costs of securitisation.

Typical Structures / Deal History

Between 1999 and 2001 there were a small number of cash CLOs of project finance loans. Since 2004, there have been five bank balance sheet project finance synthetic CLOs.

Originating banks tend to prefer synthetic structures over cash structures (where a portfolio of loans is transferred by means of a true sale to an SPV). The synthetic transfers part of the risk associated with a portfolio of loans, but not the loans themselves. As such the originating bank continues to service the loans in the normal way and preserves it relationship with the borrower.

As far as the project borrowers and sponsors are concerned, the fact that its loan is included in the reference pool of a synthetic securitisation does not change the operation of that loan in any way or under any circumstances. Given the additional liquidity that securitisation brings to the project finance market and the effect it can have on margins (this is most notable in the UK PFI market) most project borrowers and sponsors are active supporters of the synthetic securitisation process.

Given the long term nature of project finance debt, cash deals do provide a funding advantage. We understand that at least one project finance cash deal is currently at the structuring stage, however we expect the market to remain predominantly synthetic for the foreseeable future.

A summary of the main features of the synthetic deals is given in Figure 1

You will note from Figure 1 that four out of the five deals closed since November 2004 have involved the intermediation of KfW. KfW benefits from a guarantee from the Federal Republic of Germany and as such is zero risk weighted under Basel I and II. KfW will intermediate only on certain asset classes. PFI/PPP loans and bonds originated by European banks are one such asset class (the others being SMEs and certain property related assets). The fact that banks can achieve a zero risk weighting on the whole reference portfolio above the first loss/threshold amount provides a significant advantage in terms of risk asset release. This is one of the main reasons that PFI/PPP has featured so heavily in recent issuance. A typical KfW intermediated Basle I structure is given in Figure 2

In the example depicted above, the asset originating bank (the "originator") buys credit default swap protection from KfW for realised losses that occur in the reference portfolio which exceed the threshold amount. KfW in turn buys protection from a super senior investor (typically an unfunded CDS from a AAA rated monoline). The SPV (the "Issuer") issues rated notes, linked to the performance of the reference portfolio. The Issuer uses the proceeds of the notes to purchase KfW certificates ("Collateral") which are credit linked to the reference loans. KfW is then fully hedged via the super senior swap and the cash collateral from the sale of the credit linked certificates of indebtedness to the SPV.

We understand the rating agencies are currently working on six new project finance securitisations and that a number of these are not PFI/PPP related.

For example, SMBCE will securitise a portfolio of project finance loans totalling $1bn that it has originated in the 6 countries of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE). These assets will be representative of the sort of project finance that is prevalent in the region, i.e. LNG, petrochemical, refinery, power/water, etc. This will be the first securitisation of such assets and one of the very few non-property related securitisations of Middle East assets. This type of portfolio would not be eligible for KfW intermediation. As such, and as SMBCE is now operating under Basle II, the structure of this and other non intermediated transactions is as per Figure 3.

You will note that in this example the originator retains the first loss and also the super senior portion of the capital structure. This reflects a Basle II scenario where banks can risk weight retained super senior at 6/7 per cent (depending on regulatory jurisdiction).

Rating Agency Approach

All three major rating agencies have invested considerable resources in understanding project finance; they have recruited heavily from the banking sector and developed well published rating methodologies around project finance. That said, significant differences of opinion can exist between agencies with regard to the credit quality of a particular loan.

Typically, each project within the reference pool will be separately rated on a "shadow" (non-public) basis. Each asset will be assigned a recovery rate and a correlation matrix (if one loan defaults, the probability that other loans in he pool will also default) will be established for the pool. In general terms, the recovery assumptions around project finance are relatively high. The pools that have been securitised in recent years have been predominantly investment grade and correlation has generally been assessed as low.

S&P published its "Project Finance Default and Recovery Study" in December 20063.The report highlights key findings of the aggregated data experience of Standard & Poor's analysis of the historical project finance loan default and recovery rates. 32 banks participated in the study. The data comprises 4,029 projects from the period January 1st, 1990 to December 31st 2005. The data showed that project finance loans had a ten year cumulative average historical default rate of 11.34 per cent. The average recovery rate based on widely defined defaults is 72.1%. This recovery rate varies from region to region. The combined effect of strong ratings, high recovery and low correlation assumptions means that from an originators perspective, project finance debt, in general terms, lends itself to securitisation.

Practical Issues

Of course, if the rating agencies are to analyse each project separately, they require detailed information on each project. To complete the shadow rating process, the rating agencies require the level of information that would be released to a potential participant in a syndicated loan, e.g. project legal bible, due diligence reports, financial close model and depending upon the status of the project, updated project information e.g. construction and compliance certificates, construction or operation reports, updated financial model, waiver requests, etc.

Most project finance loan facility agreements prohibit the disclosure of such information to third parties. As such, we at SMBCE seek specific consent to release information to the rating agencies from each project company and where necessary, the project sponsors.

The second category of information that will be released around a securitisation is that which is released in investors. The majority of this information relates to the characteristics of the pool as a whole rather than specific data on each project e.g. portfolio breakdown by sector, geography and shadow rating, average DSCR/LLCR etc.

As a large number of project finance borrowers and sponsors are unfamiliar with securitisation and/or the rating agencies, it is worth investing some time to get all parties comfortable with the process. From the perspective of the sponsors, synthetic securitisation is preferable to a sale of the loan as it preserves the lending relationship with a bank and keeps bank syndicate size at a minimum. It also introduces a new pocket of liquidity to the project finance market. In our experience, those institutions which purchase the CLNs that come out of project finance securitisations are generally non-bank investors.

In the Middle East alone, the predicted requirement for project financing over the next 3 to 5 years is considered to be far in excess of what can be absorbed by the bank market. It is essential for borrowers and lenders alike, that originating banks develop the synthetic risk market to allow them to efficiently manage their portfolios. With regard to the PFI sector in the UK, securitisation is frequently credited with allowing certain debt providers to lend at lower margins than would have otherwise been possible.

It is worth noting that the existence of a small number of project finance securitisation programmes can not in itself cause a reduction in debt pricing across the board. The main market for the distribution of project debt is still the syndicated loan market. As such, margins can only fall to a level which is acceptable to the participant banks.

Other issues to consider from an originators perspective are the not insignificant up front and on going costs associated with securitisation e.g. legal fees, rating agency fees, trustees, accountants, arrangement and distribution fees etc. The upfront component of these costs can usually be amortised over the expected life of the deal.

Given the cost component and the requirement for a certain level of diversity in the reference pool, a portfolio of a certain type and size is necessary for the securitisation to be efficient. You will note from Figure 3 that the minimum amounts are around £400m and 24 assets. In addition to those assets included in the original reference pool it is prudent to hold an amount of eligible assets for replenishment purposes.

For these reasons a number of banks have attempted to pool portfolios and securitise on a joint basis. Given structural and regulatory issues this is very difficult to achieve.

Future

World-wide demand for infrastructure projects is growing at a tremendous rate. Our expectation is that the number of active arrangers and participants in the project finance debt market will decrease due to the effects of Basle II, margin reduction and longer tenors on the underlying loans.

Those banks which remain will need to manage their risk synthetically and recycle capital through securitisation. Investors are drawn to this asset class by the strong cash flows, low defaults and high recoveries of the underlying assets. Market permitting, we expect project finance to become an established asset class within the securitisation market within the next 12 months.

Large forces in the global capital markets

The world’s new financial power brokers

Four rising players will continue to grow in wealth and importance, even if interest rates rise and oil prices drop.

December 2007

One glance at the distribution of wealth around the world and the shift is obvious: financial power, so long concentrated in the developed economies, is dispersing. Oil-rich countries and Asian central banks are now among the world’s largest sources of capital. What’s more, the influx of liquidity these players have brought is enabling hedge funds and private-equity firms to soar in the pecking order of financial intermediation.

New research from the McKinsey Global Institute shows that the assets of these four groups of investors—the new power brokers—have nearly tripled since 2000, reaching roughly $8.5 trillion at the end of 2006 (Exhibit 1).1 This sum is equivalent to about 5 percent of total global financial assets ($167 trillion) at the end of 2006, an impressive number for players that lay on the fringes of global financial markets just five years ago.

The impact and visibility of this quartet exceed its relative size, despite the discreet way its members operate. Among other things, they have helped lower the cost of capital for borrowers around the world. In the United States, we estimate, long-term interest rates are as much as 0.75 of a percentage point lower thanks to purchases of US fixed-income securities by Asian central banks and petrodollar investors—$435 billion of net purchases in 2006 alone. Meanwhile, investors from the Middle East, pursuing returns they believe will exceed those generated by fixed-income instruments or equities in developed economies, are fueling investment in Asia and other emerging markets. Hedge funds have added to global liquidity through high trading turnovers and investments in credit derivatives, which allow banks to shift credit risk off their balance sheets and to originate more loans. Private-equity firms are having a disproportionate impact on corporate governance through leverage-fueled takeovers and subsequent restructurings.

And over the next five years, the size and impact of the four new power brokers will continue to expand.2

Oil rises to the top

In 2006 oil-exporting countries became the world’s largest source of global capital flows, surpassing Asia for the first time since the 1970s (Exhibit 2). These investors—from Indonesia, the Middle East, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, and Venezuela—include sovereign wealth funds, government-investment companies, state-owned enterprises, and wealthy individuals.

This flood of petrodollars comes from the tripling of world oil prices since 2002 and the steady growth in exports of crude oil, particularly to emerging markets. A large part of the higher prices paid by consumers ends up in the investment funds and private portfolios of investors in oil-exporting countries. They then invest most of it in global financial markets, adding liquidity that helps to explain what US Federal Reserve Board of Governors chairman Ben Bernanke described as a "global savings glut" that has kept interest rates down over the past few years. In 2006 alone, we estimate at least $200 billion of petrodollars went to global equity markets, more than $100 billion to global fixed-income markets, and perhaps $40 billion to global hedge funds, private-equity firms, and other alternative investments. This capital is invested chiefly in Europe and the United States, but regions such as Asia, the Middle East, and other emerging markets are also significant beneficiaries.

Although the added liquidity from petrodollars has helped buttress global financial markets, it may also be creating inflationary pressure in illiquid markets, such as those for real estate and art. The unanswered question is whether the world economy will continue to accommodate higher oil prices without a notable rise in inflation or an economic slowdown.

Where the wealth is . . .
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—are the largest oil exporters. Together, we estimate, they had foreign assets of $1.6 trillion to $2 trillion by the end of 2006 (Exhibit 3). Other states in the region, including Algeria, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, held an estimated $330 billion; the other oil exporters combined, about $1.5 billion. At the end of 2006, the oil exporters collectively owned $3.4 trillion to $3.8 trillion in foreign financial assets.

Much attention around the world has recently been devoted to the oil exporters’ sovereign wealth funds, which are indeed large. By some estimates, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) holds nearly $875 billion in foreign assets, Norway’s Government Pension Fund $300 billion, Russia’s Oil Stabilization Fund $100 billion, and the Kuwait Investment Authority $200 billion. But oil investors as a whole are a more diverse group, with hundreds of individual players. We calculate that private individuals who actively invest in global financial markets hold at least 40 percent of the foreign wealth purchased with petrodollars. Also important are the oil-exporting states’ central banks (such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) and private-equity-like funds, including Dubai International Capital.

. . . and where it’s going

Compared with traditional players such as pension funds and mutual funds, the assets of petrodollar investors are relatively modest. Still, they have been growing at an impressive rate of 19 percent a year since 2000 and will continue to increase their impact on world financial markets because of escalating energy demand from China, India, and other emerging markets. Even in a base case with oil prices reverting to $50 a barrel,4 the oil-exporting countries would have net capital outflows5 of $387 billion a year through 2012—an infusion of more than $1 billion a day of capital into global financial markets. Over the next five years, we estimate, this flow would generate investments of $1.4 trillion in equities, $800 billion in fixed-income securities, and $300 billion for private-equity firms, hedge funds, and real estate. The oil exporters’ total foreign assets would grow to at least $5.9 trillion in 2012.

If oil prices remained at $70 a barrel until 2012—and they neared $100 in November 2007 as this article went to press—foreign assets purchased with petrodollars would grow to $6.9 trillion by then. This figure implies an inflow of almost $2 billion a day into global financial markets. Even if oil prices declined to $30 a barrel, foreign assets purchased with petrodollars would grow robustly (Exhibit 4). This enormous pool will continue to provide liquidity for capital markets but may also cut investment returns and create inflationary pressures in areas such as real estate.

Reserves: Asia’s opportunity cost

Second in size to petrodollars are the reserves of Asia’s central banks—reserves that have grown rapidly as a result of rising trade surpluses, foreign-investment inflows, and exchange rate policies. In 2006, Asia’s central banks held $3.1 trillion in foreign-reserve assets, 64 percent of the global total and nearly three times the amount they held in 2000. Compared with petrodollars, these assets are concentrated in just a handful of institutions. China alone had amassed around $1.4 trillion in reserves by mid-2007.

Unlike investors with petrodollars, Asia’s central banks have channeled their funds into conservative investments, such as US treasury bills. We estimate that by the end of 2006, these institutions had $1.9 trillion more in foreign reserves than they needed for exchange rate and monetary stability.6 Because they could have invested that sum in higher-yielding opportunities, the forgone returns represent a significant opportunity cost (Exhibit 5). On the relatively conservative assumption that alternative investments in a higher-yielding capital market portfolio might yield 5 percent more than US Treasury bills, that cost for Asia’s major economies, in 2006 alone, was almost $100 billion—1.1 percent of their total GDP.
What to do with growing reserves?

As trade surpluses accumulate, the opportunity cost of Asia’s reserves will become even greater. If recent growth continues, they will reach $7.3 trillion in 2012. Even if China’s current-account surplus declined dramatically over the next five years and Japan’s remained the same, Asia’s reserve assets would grow to $5.1 trillion by 2012 (Exhibit 6).

n a quest for higher returns, some Asian governments have begun to diversify their assets by channeling some of their reserves to sovereign wealth funds similar to those of oil-exporting nations. The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), established in 1981, now has an estimated $150 billion to $200 billion in assets and according to public statements has plans to increase them to $300 billion. Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) has $20 billion in assets, the new China Investment Corporation (CIC) $200 billion. The assets of Asia’s sovereign wealth funds could collectively reach $700 billion in the next few years, with the potential for even more growth.

Such a shift will benefit Asian nations through higher investment returns and spread the "Asian liquidity bonus" beyond the US fixed-income market. Given the large and rapidly growing amounts of reserves used to purchase assets, however, US interest rates won’t necessarily rise as a result. Over time, a greater share of the investments made by the sovereign wealth funds may stay within Asia, spurring the development of its financial markets.

Beneficiaries of liquidity

Hedge funds and private-equity funds are among the beneficiaries of the added liquidity that Asian and oil-rich countries bring to global markets. Assets under management in hedge funds totaled $1.7 trillion by the middle of 2007. But after taking into account leverage, we estimate that their gross investment assets could amount to as much as $6 trillion, more than the foreign assets of investors from oil-producing countries or Asia’s central banks.8

Although the failure of several multibillion-dollar hedge funds in mid-2007 may slow the sector’s growth, investors usually look to the long term; it would take several years of low returns before these vehicles lost their appeal. What’s more, oil investors are big clients of hedge funds and private-equity funds, with around $350 billion committed today, and high oil prices could more than double that sum over the next five years. Even if the growth of the hedge funds’ assets were to slow significantly—say, to 5 percent a year—by 2012 they could still reach $3.5 trillion (Exhibit 7). Taking into account leverage, hedge funds would then have gross investments of $9 trillion to $12 trillion, about a third of the assets that mutual funds around the world will have in that year.

Hedge funds as financial engines

Thanks to the size and active-trading styles of hedge funds, they play an increasingly significant role in global financial markets: in 2006 they accounted for 30 to 60 percent of trading volumes in the US and UK equity and debt markets, and in some higher-risk asset classes, such as derivatives and distressed debt, they are the largest type of player (Exhibit 8). Although petrodollar investors and Asia’s central banks add liquidity by bringing in new capital, hedge funds do so by trading actively and playing a large role in credit derivative markets. In this way, they increase the number of financing options available to borrowers (including private-equity firms) that might have found it hard to attract financing in the past, and their active trading improves the pricing efficiency of financial markets.


How risky?

Worries persist that the hedge funds’ growing size and heavy borrowing could destabilize financial markets. But our research finds that over the past ten years several developments have reduced—though certainly not eliminated—the risk of a broader crisis if one or more funds collapsed.

For one thing, their investment strategies are becoming more diverse (Exhibit 9). Ten years ago more than 60 percent of their assets were invested in directional bets on macroeconomic indicators. That share has shrunk to just 15 percent today. Arbitrage and other market-neutral strategies have become more common, thereby reducing herd behavior—one reason most hedge funds withstood the US subprime turmoil in 2007. Several large quantitative-equity arbitrage funds simultaneously suffered large losses, indicating that their trading models were more similar than previously thought. But, overall, the sector emerged relatively unscathed.

In addition, banks now manage risk more capably; the largest appear to have enough equity and collateral to cover losses from their hedge fund investments. Our analysis indicates that the top ten banks’ total exposure to credit and derivatives risk from hedge funds is 2.4 times equity—a relatively high capital adequacy ratio of 42 percent.

Private equity: small but powerful

Private equity has gained prominence less because of its size than its impact on corporate governance. Although assets under management rose 2.5 times, to $710 billion, from 2000 to 2006, the private-equity industry is roughly half the size of the hedge funds, smaller than the largest petrodollar fund (the ADIA), and growing more slowly than either.

Even so, thanks to typical investment horizons of four to five years, concentrated ownership positions, and seats on the board of directors, private-equity funds can embark upon longer-term, and therefore potentially more effective, corporate-restructuring efforts. Not all private-equity firms live up to that billing, however. Our research shows that only the top-performing ones sustainably improve the operations of the companies in their portfolios and generate high returns.

The growing size of individual firms—and "club deals" combining the muscle of several firms or investors—have enabled them to buy ever-larger companies. Private-equity investors accounted for one-third of all US mergers and acquisitions in 2006 and for nearly 20 percent in Europe (Exhibit 10). This wave of buyouts has prompted CEOs and boards at some companies to find new ways of strengthening their performance.

Size limits risk

Private-equity firms may also amplify the risks in financial markets—particularly credit risk—because they like to finance takeovers with leveraged loans and use their growing clout to extract looser lending covenants and better terms from banks. The credit market correction of mid-2007, however, jeopardized the financing for many private-equity deals.

Even if private-equity defaults rose sharply, they would not be likely to have broader implications for financial markets. In 2006 private-equity firms accounted for just 11 percent of overall corporate borrowing in Europe and the United States. If their default rates rose to 15 percent of all deals—the previous high was 10 percent—the implied losses would equal only 3 and 7 percent, respectively, of 2006 syndicated-lending issuance in Europe and the United States (Exhibit 11).

Growth signals a structural shift

Despite the difficult experience of some recent buyout deals, we believe that global private-equity assets under management will double to $1.4 trillion by 2012. Our projection assumes that fund-raising remains at its 2006 level in Europe and the United States and grows at half its previous rate in Asia and the rest of the world. If current growth rates in fund-raising continued, private-equity assets would reach $2.6 trillion in 2012 (Exhibit 12).

Either way, that kind of growth represents a fundamental shift in the development of financial markets. For the past 25 years, financial intermediation in mature economies has migrated steadily from bank lending to the public-equity and debt markets. The rise of private equity and the private pools of capital in sovereign wealth funds herald the resurgence of private forms of financing.

The road ahead

Regardless of whether interest rates rise or oil prices drop, the four new power brokers will continue to grow and shape the future development of capital markets. To ease the transition to the coming financial order, the players can take some useful steps.

Because capital markets function on the free flow of information, sovereign wealth funds and other types of government-investment units9 in Asia and in oil-exporting nations should consider disclosing more information about their investment strategies, target portfolio allocations, internal risk-management procedures, and governance structures. (Norway’s Government Pension Fund is a model in this respect.) Funds can allay concerns that politics will play a role in their decisions—and reduce the likelihood that regulators will act too aggressively—by publicly stating their investment goals.

Policy makers in Europe and the United States should base any regulatory response to the activities of the new power brokers on an objective appraisal of the facts. In particular, they ought to distinguish between direct foreign acquisitions of companies and passive investments by diversified players in financial markets.

Banks must protect themselves against the risks posed by hedge funds and private-equity funds. In particular, they need tools and incentives to measure and monitor their exposure accurately and to maintain enough capital and collateral to cover these risks. Currently, it is difficult to assess the dangers stemming from illiquid collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). Ratings agencies and investors alike must raise their risk-assessment game.

With the growth of credit derivatives and collateralized debt obligations, banks have in many cases removed themselves from the consequences of poorly underwritten lending. As institutions originate more and more loans without putting their own capital at risk for the long-term performance of those loans, regulators should find ways to check a decline in standards. Concerns about the rise of the four power brokers are rational. But we find cause for qualified optimism that the benefits of liquidity, innovation, and diversification they bring will outweigh the risks.