Mark-to-market apologist defends regime

The credit crunch

Mark it and weep

Mar 6th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Mark-to-market accounting hurts, but there is no better way

WITH memories of their drubbing in the dotcom bust still fresh, accountants have kept their noses clean in this financial crisis. Once again, though, they are being dragged into the fray. That is because they are enforcing fair-value accounting, in which assets must be marked regularly to the market price: that is, what they would be expected to fetch right now in a sale. Regulators and bankers fear that this “mark-to-market” approach is helping to turn a liquidity crisis into a solvency one. As holders of mortgage-backed securities and the like revalue their assets at fire-sale prices, they are running short of capital—which can lead to further sales and more write-downs. Are the beancounters ensuring a crash?

All accounting regimes are flawed, and fair-value is no exception. It is timely and transparent, but when markets collapse, prices become less reliable. How do you mark to market when there is barely any market? Some firms rely on credit-derivative indices, but these are far from perfect proxies (see article). Others cling to internal computer models, but their accountants are cracking down on them. Banks are also being asked by their auditors to put more assets into the fair-value regime's lowest bucket (for the most illiquid assets). This adds to their woes, since such assets carry a higher capital charge.

egulators worry that mark-to-market may create a “liquidity black hole”. Nerves jangle at every fire-sale, for fear that this will become the new benchmark for sticky assets. The fear is that value-at-risk systems force investment firms and banks to offload securities, leading to price falls and further sales. The temptation is to sell now, before the next lurch down. The result will be excessive write-downs—as the stable value of assets is above today's distressed level.

That is a damning list of failings. And yet, for all its pain, fair-value accounting is still the best way to value businesses. Especially if investors and regulators treat accounting rules sensibly: as a measuring stick, not a source of universal truth.

On that score the old system of historic-cost accounting was worse. In a crisis prices fall until bottom-fishers start to buy. Yet when assets were booked at their original price, rather than the market one, banks could delude themselves—and investors—that dross was gold. Under historic-cost accounting, the banks had every reason not to restructure assets, because that meant owning up to their losses. Look at Japan, where the economy was sunk for most of the 1990s by stagnant loans to “zombie” companies. Historic-cost left investors in the dark about valuations; it was also prone to fraud and fraught with moral hazard, since sloppy lending went unpunished.

The sticky end

Mark-to-market does not have to be as bad as its critics fear. Not everyone has gorged on toxic assets, and not everyone has to mark to market. This biodiversity means there will be buyers, even in the most strained markets, at the right price. Sovereign-wealth funds have poured money into troubled banks. This week PIMCO, a big fund manager, bought $1.5 billion of American municipal bonds, where yields have jumped as the crisis spread. Warren Buffett is also sniffing around.

The place for regulators to be subtle is not in reporting the figures, but in dealing with the problems they reveal. The task is to make markets resilient when the cycle turns. Central banks could offer more protection against crises in liquidity (see article). Thicker buffers could be built into the Basel II framework for bank capital. Securitised assets could be hauled from murky over-the-counter markets to exchanges, where values are clearer. Models for valuing complex securities will be refined. And regulators and accountants could ease up when banks risk a liquidity spiral—as in Europe in 2002, when insurers faced a solvency crisis over falling share prices.

It would be perverse to ignore market signals when finance is increasingly based on broad capital markets. Fair-value accounting is indeed flawed. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it is the worst kind of accounting, except for all the others.