Showing posts with label us recession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label us recession. Show all posts

Thursday, November 22, 2007

Yen carry trades unwind

Yen Trades Near Two-Year High Versus Dollar on Growth Concerns

By David McIntyre and Kosuke Goto

Nov. 22 (Bloomberg) -- The yen traded near a two-year high against the dollar on concern widening credit-market losses will slow global economic growth, pushing investors to sell higher- yielding assets financed by borrowing in Japan.

The yen was also close to the strongest in about two months against the Australian and New Zealand dollars, favorites of the so-called carry trade, as global stocks fell. The dollar reached an all-time low against the Swiss franc on concern the Federal Reserve will cut interest rates for a third time this year to prevent subprime mortgage losses dragging the U.S. economy into recession.

``There is yen strength to come,'' said Peter Pontikis, treasury strategist at Suncorp-Metway Ltd. in Brisbane, Australia. ``People are unwilling to take carry trade positions. You can't have the subprime sector implode without any consequences.''

The yen traded at 108.41 per dollar at 9:21 a.m. in Tokyo after touching 108.26 yesterday, the strongest since June 2005. The currency was at 161.01 per euro from 161.13 late yesterday, when it reached 160.08. Gains in the yen will accelerate should it rise above 108.20 per dollar today, Pontikis said.

The yen traded at 94.53 per Australian dollar from 94.39 yesterday in New York when it reached 93.72, the strongest since Sept. 11. It was at 81.41 against New Zealand's dollar from 81.50 yesterday when it touched 80.72, the highest since Sept. 18. The Nikkei 225 Stock Average fell 0.7 percent today,

Thanksgiving Holiday

Currency fluctuations may be exaggerated because U.S. stock and bond markets are closed today for the Thanksgiving holiday, said Kazuyuki Takami, a manager of the currency trading department at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, a unit of Japan's largest publicly traded bank by assets.

The dollar traded at $1.4855 per euro and 1.1018 against the Swiss franc. The U.S. currency dropped to a record low of $1.4870 per euro yesterday and earlier touched 1.1015 versus the franc.

The dollar has declined 11 percent this year against the euro as the Fed's two rate cuts since September to 4.5 percent reduced the allure of U.S. assets. The U.S. Dollar Index traded on ICE Futures U.S. in New York touched a record low of 74.944 yesterday, the weakest since the gauge started trading in 1973.

Fed Rate Cuts

The odds of the Fed cutting rates a quarter-percentage point to 4.25 percent on Dec. 11 were 90 percent, up from 68 percent a month ago, futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade show.

Reports yesterday showed the Reuters/University of Michigan's final consumer sentiment index for November fell to 76.1, while the New York-based Conference Board's index of leading U.S. economic indicators slid 0.5 percent in October.

The yield advantage of U.S. two-year Treasuries over similar-maturity Japanese government debt shrank to 2.26 percentage points today, the narrowest since 2004, making U.S. assets less attractive to international investors. The two-year German bund widened its yield advantage over comparable-maturity Treasuries to 65 basis points, the widest since 2004.

Gains in the yen may be limited by speculation importers will take advantage of its gains to buy foreign currencies.

`Good Opportunity'

``This level is a good opportunity for Japanese importers to buy the dollar against the yen,'' said Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ's Takami. ``They will take advantage of the yen's rally.''

Japan's currency may fall to 109.50 a dollar today, Takami forecast.

The yen has advanced against all 16 of the most-actively traded currencies this month as investors reduced holdings of carry trades. In that time, Australia's dollar declined 12 percent, New Zealand's currency weakened 8.6 percent while South Africa's rand lost 11 percent.

In carry trades, investors borrow money in low-yielding economies such as Japan and lend the funds in high-yielding countries to profit from the spread. The risk is that currency moves wipe out earnings. When the trade weakens, traders sell high-yielding assets and buy yen to repay borrowings.

Volatility Declines

One-month implied volatility for the yen fell to 14.75 percent today, down from 14.98 percent yesterday. Implied volatility on one-month euro-dollar options also slid to 17 percent from 18 percent yesterday.

The benchmark interest rate in Australia is 6.75 percent while New Zealand's is 8.25 percent. Japan's borrowing cost is 0.5 percent while Switzerland's is 2.75 percent.

``People are worried about a slowdown in global growth and they are running away from risky assets, giving a boost to the yen's strength,'' said Michael Malpede, a senior currency analyst in Chicago at Man Global Research, part of MF Global Ltd., the world's largest broker of exchange-traded futures and options contacts. ``The fear is that we may see a few more shoes drop.''

The cost of borrowing in dollars for three months rose to the highest in four weeks yesterday, said the British Bankers' Association. U.S., European and Asian stocks sank. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index fell 1.6 percent, erasing its gain this year.

The spread, or extra yield, investors demand to own emerging-market dollar bonds instead of Treasuries widened to 2.6 percentage points yesterday, the most since 2005, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s EMBI Plus index.

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

Will booming emerging markets remain an oasis of growth amidst US recession?

Recession in America
America's vulnerable economy
Nov 15th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Recession in America looks increasingly likely. Can booming emerging markets save the world economy?

IN 1929, days after the stockmarket crash, the Harvard Economic Society reassured its subscribers: “A severe depression is outside the range of probability”. In a survey in March 2001, 95% of American economists said there would not be a recession, even though one had already started. Today, most economists do not forecast a recession in America, but the profession's pitiful forecasting record offers little comfort. Our latest assessment suggests that the United States may well be heading for recession.

Granted, GDP grew by a robust 3.9%, at an annual rate, in the third quarter. Granted also, revisions may well push this figure up. But that was the past. More timely signs suggest that the economy could stall in this quarter. By early next year, output and jobs could be shrinking. The main cause is the imploding housing market. Experts said that house prices could never fall nationwide. But fall they have, by 5% in the past 12 months. Residential investment has collapsed, but a glut of unsold homes means that prices have much further to drop. Americans' spending is likely to be dented much more by a fall in house prices than it was in 2001 by the stockmarket's collapse. With house prices lower and credit conditions tighter as a result of the subprime crisis, households can no longer borrow against capital gains to support their spending.

Dearer oil is set to squeeze households further (this week's drop in crude prices notwithstanding). Consumer confidence has already fallen sharply. It cannot be long before consumer spending stumbles, which in turn would hurt companies' profits and investment. The weak dollar will boost exports, but at only 12% of GDP, exports are too small to make up for a weakening of consumer spending, which accounts for 70%.

I want to break free

Will an American recession drag the rest of the world down with it? The economies of Europe and Japan rebounded strongly in the third quarter, but look likely to slow down. Although both should be able to keep chugging along, neither is likely to set any great pace. Strengthening currencies will hurt exporters in both places. Europe's own housing hotspots are cooling, and some of its banks have been sideswiped by America's subprime ills.

The best hope that global growth can stay strong lies instead with emerging economies. A decade ago, the thought that so much depended on these crisis-prone places would have been terrifying. Yet thanks largely to economic reforms, their annual growth rate has surged to around 7%. This year they will contribute half of the globe's GDP growth, measured at market exchange rates, over three times as much as America. In the past, emerging economies have often needed bailing out by the rich world. This time they could be the rescuers.

Of course, a recession in America would reduce emerging economies' exports, but they are less vulnerable than they used to be. America's importance as an engine of global growth has been exaggerated. Since 2000 its share of world imports has dropped from 19% to 14%. Its vast current-account deficit has started to shrink, meaning that America is no longer pulling along the rest of the world. Yet growth in emerging economies has quickened, partly thanks to demand at home. In the first half of this year the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in China and India added more to global GDP growth than that in America.

Most emerging economies are in healthier shape than ever. They are no longer financially dependent on the rest of the world, but have large foreign-exchange reserves—no less than three-quarters of the global total. Though there are some notable exceptions, most of them have small budget deficits (another change from the past), so they can boost spending to offset weaker exports if need be.

This does not mean emerging economies will grow fast enough to make up for the whole of a fall in America's output. Most of them will slow a bit next year: for instance, China's growth rate may dip to “only” 10%. So global growth will ease—which, after five years at an average of almost 5%, close to its fastest pace ever, it needs to do. But thanks to the vigour of the new titans, it will stay above its 30-year average of 3.5%.

A tale of two prices

The rising importance of the world's new giants will not only boost growth. It will also shift relative prices, notably those of oil and the dollar. And the consequences of this will be less comfortable for developed countries, especially America.

The oil price has risen mainly because of strong demand in emerging economies, which have accounted for as much as four-fifths of the total increase in oil consumption in the past five years. In past American recessions the oil price usually fell. This time it is likely to hold up. That will not only hurt the finances of Western consumers, but may also make the jobs of their central bankers harder, by combining inflationary pressure with economic slowdown.

The enfeebled dollar—lately in sight of $1.50 to the euro—would be weaker still without enormous purchases by central banks in emerging economies. This support is now waning. China and others are putting a smaller share of increases in reserves into the American currency. And Asian and Middle Eastern countries with currencies linked to the dollar are facing rising inflation, but falling American interest rates make it harder to tighten their own monetary policy. They may have to let their currencies rise against the sickly greenback, meaning they will need to buy fewer dollars. More important, as international investors wake up to the relative weakening of America's economic power, they will surely question why they hold the bulk of their wealth in dollars. The dollar's decline already amounts to the biggest default in history, having wiped far more off the value of foreigners' assets than any emerging market has ever done.

The vigour of emerging economies is good news for the world economy: for its growth, it has much less need of a strong America. The bad news for America is that this, in turn, may mean that the world also has less need of the dollar.

Hard landing expected

With Recession becoming inevitable the Concensus shifts towards the Hard Landing View. And the Rising Risk of a Systematic Financial Meltdown
Nouriel Roubini | Nov 16, 2007

It is increasingly clear by now that a severe U.S. recession is inevitable in next few months. Those of us who warned for the last 12 months about a combination of a worsening housing recession, a severe credit crunch and financial meltdown, high oil prices and a saving-less and debt-burdened consumers being on the ropes causing an economy-wide recession were repeatedly rebuffed the consensus view about a soft landing given the presumed resilience of the US consumer.

But the evidence is now building that an ugly recession is inevitable. Thus, the repeated statements by Fed officials that they may be done with cutting the Fed Funds rate are both hollow and utterly disingenuous. The Fed Funds rate will be down to 4% by January and below 3% by the end of 2008.

More revealing of the change in mood the financial press and some of the most prominent market analysts are coming to the realization that a recession is highly likely. The Economist has a cover story and long piece arguing that a US recession highly likely (and citing this author's work with Menegatti and our views on the inevitability of such a recession).

More importantly, on Wall Street some of the leading analysts that had been in the soft landing camp for the last year have now moved their forecast in the direction of hard landing. It is not just David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch who has been informally in the hard landing camp and is now explicitly talking about a consumer recession. It is not just Jan Hatzius of Goldman Sachs who was always more bearish relative to the soft landing consensus and is today explicitly talking about a US recession and a credit crunch reducing lending by $2 trillion.

Even in soft landing houses such as Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan the tone is completely different now. At Morgan Stanley Steve Roach was the in-house bear while Richard Berner (a most sophisticated economist and analyst) was the in-house soft landing optimist. With Roach now gone to run Morgan Stanley Asia, the commentary by Richard Berner has become increasingly darker. And the latest Monday piece by Berner is titled “The Perfect Storm for the US Consumer” where his points on the headwind forces hitting the US consumer are completely overlapping with my analysis of such risks in my recent “The Coming US Consumption Slowdown that Will Trigger an Economy-Wide Hard Landing. Berner starts with

“Serious pressures are mounting on the US consumer on five fronts: Job growth is slowing, surging energy and food quotes are draining purchasing power, adjustable rate mortgages are resetting, lending standards are tightening, and housing wealth will likely decline. Do these dark clouds finally and ominously herald the perfect consumer storm?”

And he concludes with:

“Risks to the consumer are rising, and the risk of outright US recession is higher now than at any time in the past six years: Housing is in sharp decline, consumers are vulnerable, and companies may cut capital spending and liquidate inventories. A strong contribution from global growth is still a huge positive, but spillovers from US weakness to trading partners may hobble that lone source of strength. These pressures could last longer or be more intense than I expect. And even if the economy skirts overall recession, corporate earnings will likely decline.”

An even more persistently bullish bank was JP Morgan that kept on warning for the last year that the biggest risks to the US economy was not a growth slowdown but rather a growth pickup and the risk that inflation would surprise on the upside and force a behind-the-curve Fed to raise the Fed Funds rate above 6%. This analysis obviously proved wrong and now the very smart – but mistaken - Bruce Kasman has had to throw in the towel and accept that the downside risks to grow are sharp and that the Fed will cut the Fed Funds rate to 4%. As he put it in his latest note:

US outlook change: More drag, more ease -- Drags from energy, and credit tightening push GDP forecast to 1% on average for current and upcoming quarter -- Fed is likely to recognize growing downside risk and ease 50bp, to 4% by end of 1Q08 -- December meeting outcome remains close, but we now expect 25bp move from a proactive Fed As the US moves through the fourth quarter, incoming economic news remains consistent with our forecast of a growth “pot hole”. Powerful drags now in place — from tighter credit conditions and an intensified contraction in residential investment — are evident in the decline in output and employment in the goods producing industries and in a slowing in consumption spending…. …three developments over the past month look set to increase downward pressure on growth.

• Oil on the boil. Global crude oil prices rose more than $10 dollars during October, and has held at an elevated level this month. If current levels are maintained, it would represent a drag on annualized household income of approximately one percentage point between now and the end of the first quarter. This drag, which has yet to have been felt, adds to the forces weighing on consumer spending.

• Temporary lifts to fade. Although an upward revision to 3Q07 growth to close to 5% now looks likely, this outcome is partly borrowing from growth in the quarters ahead. Defense spending, which has grown at a 9% annualized pace in the past two quarters, is almost certainly due for a pause. And a significant upward revisions to inventory building in 3Q07, points to an adjustment ahead. Indeed, the latest rise in ISM customer inventory index, combined with auto production schedules pointing to cutbacks through year end, suggests that stockbuilding is likely to subtract from growth this quarter and next.

• Credit tightening broadens. Results of the Fed’s latest Senior Loan Officers Survey indicates that credit conditions are tightening broadly and that demand for credit is slowing. Most recently, credit conditions have tightened significantly for commercial construction projects with CMBS securitizations plunging over the past couple of months. While the quantitative effects of this tightening is hard to measure, credit conditions look set to remain tight for a longer period than anticipated in our current forecast.

Taken together, these developments warrant a downward revision to an already sluggish growth forecast for the coming quarters. The trajectory of GDP growth is being lowered by one half percentage point per quarter through the middle of 2008, with the path of consumption, stockbuilding, and nonresidential construction activity shouldering much of the burden. During this quarter and next, GDP growth is expected to be particularly soft, averaging a meager 1% percent. The underlying resiliency of the US corporate sector will be severely tested through a period in which profits are expected to contract. While we continue to believe that firms are unlikely to retrench in a manner that produces a recession, the risks of a recession remain uncomfortably high. We currently place the risk of a recession taking hold in the coming two quarters at 35%. The Federal Reserve has made it clear that it is willing to act preemptively in the face of elevated recession risks. Having moved 75bp in two meetings, its October statement signalled that it viewed the risks to growth and inflation as balanced — a message that the bar for further easing was high. Against this backdrop, the Fed will need to shift materially its perceptions of risks about the outlook in the direction of our forecast change to produce ease. We now believe such a shift will take place and produce 50bp of additional ease by the end of the 1Q08.

When the most prominent and respected and sophisticated “soft-landing” analysts on Wall Street turn this bearish and start talking about high probability of a recession and downside risks to growth and of a consumer recession you know that these are code words for admitting implicitly – short of an official and explicit endorsement of such view that very few analysts of Wall Street can afford to have because of sell-side research constraints - that they believe that a recession is highly likely.

So at this point the debate is less and less on whether we are going to have a recession that looks inevitable; but it is rather moving towards a debate on how deep, protracted and severe such a recession will be. But the financial and real risks are much more severe than those of a mild recession.

I now see the risk of a severe and worsening liquidity and credit crunch leading to a generalized meltdown of the financial system of a severity and magnitude like we have never observed before. In this extreme scenario whose likelihood is increasing we could see a generalized run on some banks; and runs on a couple of weaker (non-bank) broker dealers that may go bankrupt with severe and systemic ripple effects on a mass of highly leveraged derivative instruments that will lead to a seizure of the derivatives markets (think of LTCM to the power of three); a collapse of the ABCP market and a disorderly collapse of the SIVs and conduits; massive losses on money market funds with a run on both those sponsored by banks and those not sponsored by banks (with the latter at even more severe risk as the recent effective bailout of the formers’ losses by theirs sponsoring banks is not available to those not being backed by banks); ever growing defaults and losses ($500 billion plus) in subprime, near prime and prime mortgages with severe known-on effect on the RMBS and CDOs market; massive losses in consumer credit (auto loans, credit cards); severe problems and losses in commercial real estate and related CMBS; the drying up of liquidity and credit in a variety of asset backed securities putting the entire model of securitization at risk; runs on hedge funds and other financial institutions that do not have access to the Fed’s lender of last resort support; a sharp increase in corporate defaults and credit spreads; and a massive process of re-intermediation into the banking system of activities that were until now altogether securitized.

When a year ago this author warned of the risk of a systemic banking and financial crisis – a combination of global liquidity and solvency/credit problems - like we had not seen in decades, these views were considered as far fetched. They are not that extreme any more today as Goldman Sachs is writing today on the risk o a contraction of credit of the staggering order of $2 trillion dollars in the next few years causing a severe credit crunch and a serious recession. As I will flesh out in a forthcoming note the risks of such a generalized systemic financial meltdown are now rising. Hopefully by now some folks at the New York Fed and at the Fed Board are starting to think about this most dangerous systemic financial crisis that could emerge in the next year and what to do to prepare for it.

Monday, November 19, 2007

The party is over, says Roach

Roach attacks global inequality



Morgan Stanley’s Stephen Roach says disproportionate profit allocation could spell the end of globalisation.

As the chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, Stephen Roach, wrapped up his early morning talk at the Asian Private Equity and Venture Forum in Hong Kong on Friday, he put up a dramatic diagram. The slide showed two lines, one angling sharply upwards, the other angling sharply downwards. The upward sloping line was the share of corporate profits as a share of the national income of the G7 countries. The downward sloping line was the share of employee compensation as a share of national income. According to the graphs, the former accounted for just under 60% and the latter around 10%. The significance of the graph is clear: the benefits of globalisation have accrued in a highly disproportionate manner to “the wealthy and the owners of capital”, as Roach put it.

"That is unsustainable," says Roach, “and provides a challenge to the future of globalisation.” On the topic of globalisation, Roach asserts that Asia has been a major beneficiary – most easily seen through the inexorable rise of exports as a proportion of GDP. But that growth model, based on open markets, could be threatened if social imbalances are not rectified.

“Politicians are not happy with those income figures. They want their voters to get more,” says Roach. Disgruntlement in the countries most affected by globalisation could lead not only to the traditional problem of trade protectionism, but also to financial protectionism. Financial protectionism is a new term referring to the US government not selling its treasury instruments to buyers it considers potentially unfriendly.

Other imbalances could also hurt globalisation. Roach makes the now well-known point that the US consumer binge of the past years was fuelled by rising asset prices being converted into cash by home and stock owners. Incomes have been relatively stagnant. “Consumption accounts for 72% of GDP, the highest levels seen any time in history.”

As the debt that was fuelling the asset bubble unwinds, people's incomes will inevitably be pinched, Roach concludes. “We are seeing the bursting of the world’s biggest bubble – US property," he says. The result is that “the US consumer is toast”, and will be unable to generate further economic momentum.

Roach says that current problems should have been foreseen, and that the dotcom crash of 2001 should have acted as the "canary in the coal mine". Despite only accounting for 6% of US equity market cap, the S&P500 had lost 49% two years later. Roach says that the downturn then was far more serious than anybody initially expected.

“There were similar arguments in August, with some commentators suggesting that since securitised mortgages only represent 14% of outstanding mortgages, there was little to worry about,” he says, predicting that the credit fall out would continue to worsen.

Consequently, Roach also sees a recession in the US next year as being "more likely than not”.

A crash now could be far worse than in the early-2000s, since business capital spent by the dotcoms accounted for 14% of GDP at the time. But the current personal consumption bubble is many times as large, since consumption represents 72% of GDP.

Nor will Asian consumption fill the gap left by the US consumer. “China accounts for around $1 trillion in personal consumption and $650 billion in India. The US accounts for $9.5 trillion of personal consumption.”

The impact on Asia of a US slowdown will be inevitable. “Asia is not an oasis from the US problems,” Roach says, given the steady rise of emerging Asia exports, from an average of 17% to 45% of GDP currently. Contrary to what many analysts say, Roach says consumption in emerging Asia has been trending down, while exports have been trending up. China has an export-to-GDP ratio of 37%, of which 21% goes to the US. Taiwan has a ratio of exports-to-GDP of 59%, of which 14.4% goes to the US. ASEAN has a corresponding figure of 72% of which 13.6% goes to the US. Japan registers a figure of exports-to-GDP of 22%, of which 13% goes to the US.

“Equity capital markets in Asia are frothy, because investors are assuming no impact on Asia. I suspect they are wrong,” he says.